PIERRE FRANCOIS

THE SOCIOLOGY OF LABOR REMUNERATION: STATE OF THE FIELD AND OUTLOOK

---

1. The Economics of Remuneration and the Sociology of Inequality

For long marginal with respect to the priorities of sociological research, analysis of the valuation of the goods and services circulating in markets has recently begun to occupy a more important position (Beckert, 2009; Stark, 2009; Vatin, 2009). In the particular case of labor markets, the hitherto prevailing division of tasks between economists and sociologists led the former to concentrate primarily on the matter of defining salary levels and their consequences, while the latter largely ignored them—such is the assessment proffered by Langton and Pfeffer (1994) and Morris and Western (1999), to which we return later. Recent contributions to sociology have made the question of remuneration levels—whether high (Godechot, 2007) or very low (François and Chartrain, 2009)—a core element of their inquiries. From their work, it is clear that examination of how the value of labor and the wages paid for it are assessed is essential to the research agenda of market sociology, for which Beckert has identified the critically important "value problem" (Beckert, 2009). Yet, despite having not been explicitly addressed in the labor market sociology literature, has this question been totally ignored? Is the divide between economists and sociologists anything more than an effect of labels and categories? For although the valuation of labor and the definitions of remuneration flowing from it are central to the research program of economists, sociology has also taken on these subjects, though in an indirect way.

If one examines the sociological literature without heeding chapter headings and statements of purpose and takes stock of the questions actually handled in field studies, the clear-cut separation between the disciplines becomes very blurry. Even though they are not always trained in economic sociology, sociologists have much to contribute to the question of salaries, and the links between sociology and economics are not born of one field's complete ignorance of the other.

This is readily apparent in the fact that while sociology has not made of the analysis of remuneration one of its objects of predilection, it has nonetheless address the topic indirectly in handling one of the discipline's principal themes: the study of social inequality. Since Weber, it has been widely known that social inequality cannot be put down solely to economics (Weber, 1995; Bihagen, 2005), for salaries are surely only one source of economic inequality among social actors just as labor is only one of their sources of income.[1] The trend has thus been to distinguish among labor income, social income and investment income. However, Piketty (2004) reminds us that labor income represents a relatively stable majority share (about 60%) of total household incomes in the economies of developed nations. Though the economic scale of it prevents us from taking on all of the social inequalities of interest to sociology, labor income plays enough of a structural role to merit further investigation. Since the foundational work of Blau and Duncan (1967) the literature on social inequality has shed important light on the inequality of men's and women's incomes (Marini, 1989; Hannan et *al.*, 1990; Bernhardt et *al.*, 1995; Cotter et *al.,* 1997; Brainerd, 2000; Blau and Kahn, 2006; Gupta et *al.*, 2006; Johansson et *al.*, 2005; Mandel and

---

[1] It is important point out that we focus here on the *monetary* remuneration of labor, and have thus set aside the other forms of reward that an actor may receive for accomplishing a task, whether symbolic or psychological (Kalleberg, 1977; Jencks et *al.*, 1988; Baudelot and Gollac, 2003). This is not to suggest that such forms of retribution are negligible; rather, the question we pursue is sufficiently complex in its purely monetary dimension that we have chosen not to broaden the subject further.

Semyonov, 2005), and the salary discrimination confronting members of minority groups (Lieberson, 1980; Kaufman, 1983; Carpenter, 2005; Western and Pettit, 2005).

Our question is more specific: what role does the study of *labor markets* play in determining wages? According to Granovetter and Tilly (1988) the effects of the categories used in studying income inequality—such as gender or ethnicity—can only be understood by reconstituting a chain of causality which, sooner or later, leads to what they call a "labor process": in other words, variables such as these play a role in shaping income inequality, but only to the extent that their effect is mediated by economic mechanisms. In more specific terms, inequalities between men and women or between communities can in their view be explained by looking at the dynamics of job rankings on the one hand, and those of matching individuals with jobs on the other. It is because gender and ethnicity weigh on these mechanisms that differences in remuneration levels appear and persist. It indeed seems accepted that, as Morris and Western (1999) suggest, inquiries since Blau and Duncan into the processes that produce social inequalities have given more and more importance to *economic* mechanisms (Gerber, 2006).

This begs the question: what mechanisms are they talking about? At the risk of simplifying, one can distinguish two large groups of hypotheses, both of which are borrowed from economics: human capital and segmentation. The theory of human capital dates from the Sixties and comes from the Chicago economists (Becker, 1983). It introduces the hypothesis of the heterogeneity of the labor factor while maintaining its neo-classical framework of reasoning: social actors dispose of varying reserves of human capital, and thus are unequally capable of contributing to the production of goods and services. The population (workforce) is therefore distributed as a function of the level of human capital; labor demand depends on the demand for goods and the level of human capital necessary to produce them, and the play of supply and demand determines the levels of remuneration associated with the various levels of human capital. This simple hypothesis—that salary levels depend on training—has been tested in a number of studies that sought to grasp remuneration in sociological terms (Waldinger and Robertson, 1994; Barron et *al*., 1993; Tienda and Lii., 1987; Zhou and Logan, 1989; Black et *al*., 2005; Tomaskovic-Devey et *al*., 2005). It was largely to counter this first approach that other sociologists borrowed the second hypothesis in an attempt to define a sociological program for the study of remuneration. To them, sociologists who make use of the human capital hypothesis share the same premise with orthodox labor market economists: they index differences of remuneration to *individual* characteristics. To such an atomized approach of the social sphere they sought an opposing perspective that underscored how differences in remuneration relate first and foremost to *collective* data and, more specifically, social *structures*. This in turn begs the question, which 'structures'? The term is generic enough to refer to extremely varied sets of problems; however, the 'structures' referred to most often are segments of the labor market. The labor market is not homogenous, but is instead divided into segments that have varying levels of remuneration as well as heterogeneous methods for determining remuneration. The analysis of remuneration then focuses no longer on the individual characteristics of wage-earners but instead on the collective structures (segments) into which they fall (Averitt, 1968; Piore, 1973, 1975, 1978). Much empirical work has relied on the segmentation theory (Neuman and Ziderman, 1986; Domanski, 1990; Baron and Bielby, 1984; Kalleberg et *al*., 1981; McManus, 2000; Menger, 2003), but the ultimate goal some hoped to achieve with it has been elusive, that of founding a specifically sociological approach to labor markets and to the formation labor remuneration. Most texts that raise the question in these terms—whether to plead for this sort of sociological imperialism (Kalleberg and Sorensen, 1979; Granovetter, 1981; Kalleberg, 1989) or to demolish it (Smith, 1990) —have remained essentially programmatic. Sociology has not ignored the question of remuneration, and in sociology's understanding of it economic mechanisms play a central role. However, do these economic mechanisms not themselves turn on the notion of *labor market*? To what extent should our understanding of the mechanisms behind the valuation and determination of labor remuneration be informed by market sociology?

Taken on their own, these concepts seem to follow from one another: if sociology is going to borrow the two central hypotheses guiding the work explicitly devoted to this question from economics, then the notion of the market must indeed be instrumental in understanding remuneration. The theory of human capital rests on a series of optimal decisions made by actors who choose to pursue training, and by employers who bring the worker's marginal cost into parity with his or her marginal productivity (which in turn depends on prior investment). The theories of segmentation question the hypothesis that markets are homogenous, but do not call their existence into question: it is indeed markets that segments divide. Looked at more closely, the notion of market—paradoxically—turns out to be analytically superfluous to the sociological research that makes use of these hypotheses. The theory of human capital essentially provides a frame for approaches that seek to measure the impact of the effects of training and skills accumulation on remuneration. As for work that hinges on "structural" hypotheses, it too employs the latter as a structural framework that shapes the determination of remunerations. The market is at best an arena to be deconstructed and segmented, and almost never enters into the analysis as an analytical tool.

Going further, sociological texts can be divided between those that make use of a notion of the market that the authors attribute to economists and that assimilates the market *de facto* with pure and perfect competition, and those that propose a much more generic sociological understanding of the market (such as that of Kalleberg and Sorensen [1979]). The former focus their analyses on situations that they define in opposition to the 'pure' market, namely internal markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) or closed markets (Sarfati-Larson, 1977; Paradeise, 1984); for the latter, the labor markets designate the following:

> […] arenas in which workers exchange their manpower for salaries, status and other forms of remuneration. As a consequence, the concept refers primarily to the institutions and practices governing sales, purchases, and the setting of prices for labor services. These structures include the ways in which workers are distributed among jobs and the rules governing work, mobility, the acquisition of skills and training, as well as the distribution of salaries and other forms of remuneration. (351-352)

The idea of the market in both cases is ultimately of little use for analysis. Inasmuch as one is given to conflate the market with pure competition—an assimilation fraught with problems, to say the least—the 'economists' market' is too far removed from reality to expect any empirical gains from it to distance us from results established previously: as a result, a situation that economists deploy as an analytical reference is in fact an empirical exception, and is one that presupposes extremely heavy investment to be achieved (Garcia, 1986). In adopting Kalleberg and Sorenson's definition (1979) one does have a context within which to reason, but one is still far from possessing an analytical tool: how does one go about identifying within their critical framework the "market forces" which one must either passively surrender to or push back against, depending on one's political options? The temptation is great in such conditions to abandon the term or make of it a local preconception that analysis will seek to deconstruct and substitute with other tools deemed analytically better founded, whether networks (Granovetter, 1995), actor systems and organizational processes (Friedberg, 1997), labor processes (Granovetter and Tilly, 1988), or labor systems (Marsden, 1999). Following each of these conclusions further underscores the labor market's share in the analysis of remuneration: if one of the results of analysis is to show that labor markets do not exist, then those results can in no way bear upon our understanding of the differences in remuneration that do exist.

The notion of labor market does not have to be abandoned. In the following pages, we seek to demonstrate the usefulness of Max Weber's definition of the market as presented by R. Swedberg (1998) by showing how research on the determination of remuneration can find its place in this analytical context. R. Swedberg (1998) reminds us that even though Weber considered the market to refer to an "amorphous structure" (1992), his definition of the notion of market is undoubtedly one of the most functional definitions available to sociologists. For Weber (1995b), "one must talk about markets once a majority of candidates for an exchange enter into competition for a chance at the exchange, no matter how one-sided" (410). Swedberg (1998) lends further precision to this definition by noting that a market can be broken down into two sets of interaction. The first game of interaction puts all of those on the side of demand into competition on the one hand, and suppliers on the other; this process of competition allows for selection of a particular supplier and demander, who are then likely to proceed with an exchange. The second game of interaction concerns *the exchange* between *one* particular supplier and *one* particular demander. This definition is the one we shall retain here, while showing how the research on the question of remuneration can shape and expand it.

2. Competition and Remuneration

Competitive Strategies

Following the definitions Weber (1978) and Simmel (1999, p. 297-319) give of competition, we might suggest that it denotes an indirect struggle over opportunities for exchange. Consequently, this presupposes the accumulation of resources and the implementation of strategies aimed not at delivering blows *directly* at adversaries but that lead instead to parallel efforts by actors in conflict in the market (François, 2008). Analysis of the first game of interaction allows us to pinpoint new approaches that may help account for how remuneration takes shape. Levels of remuneration can depend on the resources actors commit to their competitive struggles. Hence Granovetter (1995), in his classic study of the white-collar labor market in Boston shows how "weak links" represent the most efficient resource at the disposal of actors; more precisely, actors who mobilized "weak links" in the search for employment have access to better-paying jobs than those who utilized other resources. Testing this hypothesis, Bridges and Willemez (1986) and Marsden and Hulbert (1988) show that the net effect of labor relations is less clear than that evidenced by Granovetter; their results notwithstanding, the attention given by each to the modalities of competitive struggle among actors and their implications for remuneration levels is decisive.

Remuneration level is not only a *result* of competitive struggles: it can also be an *instrument* of them. Workers may be tempted to lower their salary expectations in order to increase their chances of being hired. Yet competition over remuneration does not occur only among those supplying labor: attention must be given to the competing strategies among companies to understand how salaries are defined in certain labor markets. In the labor market for musicians specialized in ancient music, remuneration offered by the ancient music ensembles is one of the key elements in the competitive struggle that pits them against each other in the labor market. That labor market struggle is itself determined by the relative positions the ensembles hold in the various markets in which they compete, namely concert, compact disc and sponsorship markets (François, 2005). The competitive strategies of the various actors and the resources they mobilize cannot properly be understood without taking into consideration the characteristics of the goods and services that the workforce allows one to produce. They are thus strongly marked by the more or less high degree of uncertainty that weights on the product market. S. Rosen (1981) has shown how the large differences in remuneration seen in the cultural industries are a reflection of how uncertainty is managed: by concentrating the bulk of production on a few safe bets, by reproducing a single product in great quantities (a CD or a film, for example), one can profit the most from major economies of scale, and keep outsiders—whose chances of success are uncertain—on the margins, where remuneration is much smaller.

It is therefore obvious that analysis of the competition between suppliers on the one hand and demanders on the other must not lead one to neglect one of the accepted principles of market sociology which, ever since Hirsch's foundational article (1972) has been highly interested in "market intermediaries" (Cochoy and Dubuisson, 2000). These intermediaries merit analysis as actors intervening in the definition and implementation of the competitive strategies of suppliers and demanders. For instance, Bielby and Bielby (1999) show how decisive the role agencies play in shaping the careers of script-writers is: authors taken on by those agents who go beyond their simple intermediary roles and take an active part in productions are likely to be better paid than those represented by more traditional agents. Focusing on competitive strategies requires that one reconstruct the strategies, alliances, and resources invested by actors in the indirect struggle pitting them against one another.

Among the various competitive strategies, what Weber called "closure" plays a highly significant role in the labor markets, since it refers to situations that one might call "professional"—in the sense of profession as opposed to occupation (Parsons, 1965; Wilensky, 1964)—or "closed labor markets"(Sarfati-Larson, 1977; Paradeise, 1984). In situations where one group gains a monopoly over the completion of a specific task and eventually becomes able to determine how the labor market is regulated within itself, it is possible for the modalities by which remuneration is defined to become stabilized: in such cases, the resources needed to earn an increase in remuneration are stabilized and formalized, and remuneration ceases to be a discriminatory resource in the struggle among various actors. Karpik's work on lawyers illustrates the importance that ought to be given to the question of price in analysis of professional groups. Karpik situates the question of remuneration within the context of an "economy of quality" in which the encounter between supply and demand is not guaranteed by changes in price but instead by an agreement on quality: price is decided after the transactional principle has been established. In this context, he shows that lawyer honoraria are determined in the context of an economy of moderation: the asymmetry of information that constitutes the relationship between lawyers (who know their quality) and their clients (who do not) is mitigated by an economy of moderation, in other words by the control the group exerts on itself. Thus the strategy of closure that had caught Mr. Weber's attention can be found at the heart of the practices of professional groups amply studied by the sociology of professions. It is nonetheless one strategy among the many weighing on the determination of remuneration: the result of struggles as well as an instrument, remuneration lies at the core of the competitive processes at work in labor markets.

Institutions of Competition

The competitive struggle does not take place in a social vacuum, far from it: it is framed by rules, mechanisms, and organizations, institutions that help define what level of resources is appropriate in the struggle with other actors. Our purpose here is not to mark out economic institutions that have been widely studied in the past thirty years (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Greenwood et *al.*, 2008); instead we point to examples of institutions that weigh in on the determination of remuneration. The first type of institution capable of shaping competitive processes refers to what Descombes (1996) calls the "institutions of meaning," and that followers of Durkheim designated as categories of collective understanding. In negotiations and strategies, actors mobilize capacities for action and categories of understanding that are socially instituted, and that inform the way in which they enter into competition with the other actors in the labor market. A brief look at R. Biernacki's (1995) key scholarship helps drive this point home. In his comparison of the invention of labor in England and Germany, Biernacki develops the following simple hypothesis: according to him, "different conceptions of labor-as-commodity engendered national differences in method of remuneration, assessment of products and costs, disciplinary techniques, labor rights, and even factory architecture" (p.2). The two conceptions of labor-as-commodity, manpower in Germany and materialized labor in England, have much to do with how remuneration is calculated. In both countries, weavers were paid by the piece; in England, however, fabric length and thickness were part of the basis for remuneration, while in Germany, fabric thickness and the number of return trips of the cart were factored into remuneration (p. 41 and *infra*). For Biernacki, these two modes of calculation refer directly to the contrasting notions of labor-as-commodity prevailing in England and Germany, the first emphasizing materialized labor (England) and the second privileging manpower (Germany). The varying factors used in calculating remuneration are indices of categories of collective understanding for Biernacki, categories with which employers and employees reason when confronting each other or when competing in the labor market.

Categories of understanding are nonetheless just one example of an institution shaping the competitive dynamics at work in the labor market and weighing upon the strategies of actors in it. Much more explicit and formalized rules also help define what resources are appropriate for actors to bring to bear in the competitive struggle. The competitive processes of labor markets are in part framed by rules instituted in collective bargaining. The substantial field of inquiry into employment relations has a number of critical contributions to make to the analysis of remuneration: in Western countries, the impact of employment relations (gauged by the rate of membership in unions) accounts for 20 to 40% of remuneration inequality (Card, 1992a; Morris and Western, 1999), despite the extent—real or imagined—to which collective bargaining has eroded in those countries (Wallerstein et *al.*, 1997). Collective bargaining has two primary effects. First, it helps raise the average level of remunerations, by taking advantage of a reduction of competition among workers that can ultimately grant workers monopoly power: numerous studies on both smaller-scale and national levels have found evidence of a connection between rates of union membership and average levels of remuneration (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Feldman, 1982; Moll, 1993). Collective bargaining also reduces the scattering of remuneration by defining scales that firmly match remuneration levels to levels of qualification and by instituting mechanisms for automatic promotion. This is in contrast to individualized systems for determining remuneration based on merit that favor increased competition among labor suppliers and a greater heterogeneity in remuneration (Freeman, 1980; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Moll, 1993). Employment relations thus bear on the determination of remuneration in that they frame—to lesser and greater extents—the competitive strategies of the various actors. Once salary scales are in place for instance, the room for maneuver of various actors has changed, and the processes for determining remuneration depend less on competitive strategies and more on shared rules.

Research on employment relations has done more than just shed light on the effects of union membership on specific labor markets; it has also explored the conditions and circumstances in which the power of labor unions shapes the processes for determining remuneration. How, for instance, does the power of unions vary as a function of the concentration of the industry in which they operate? There are differing answers to this question. For instance, Hirsch and Connolly (1987) show that the effects of unionization on remuneration are no more noticeable in highly concentrated industries, while Rose (1991) builds on Ashenfelter and Johnson's model of union negotiation power (1969) to show that conglomerates are better suited to face union demands. It is only by going beyond the single measurement of concentration and making the criteria with which we account for the heterogeneity of firms and industries more sophisticated that we can understand the conditions in which unions manage to win profits for employees. Hirsh and Connolly (1987) suggest abandoning measurements of concentration in favor of funding for R&D and measuring competitive protections provided to firms and industries, and Mishel (1986) intersects several criteria (the structure of product markets, negotiation structures, union divisions) to show that salary gains achieved by unions are greater when the discretionary power of firms in the product market is greater, that negotiation is centralized, and that unions are not fragmented. When firms belong to markets that are highly competitive and they exert little power over product pricing, the centralization of negotiation is of negligible benefit.

A considerable part of the mechanisms that frame and shape competitive struggles emerge from collective bargaining and belong to the study of employment relations. The state also plays a decisive role, by imposing rules that define minimal levels of remuneration or by setting up salary guarantee mechanisms that modify the competitive strategies of actors in the labor market. Public power usually intervenes in wage competition in order to establish minimum levels. The consequences of introducing a minimum wage have gotten much attention, but what are its effects on average remuneration levels and how they distribute themselves out? What are its effects on employment? The assessment proposed by Card and Krueger (1995) hints that introducing a minimum wage tends to increase the average level of remuneration without negatively impacting employment; such is the case explored in the famous study by Katz and Krueger (1992) of fast food restaurants in New Jersey, and in Card's work (1992b) on the effects of increasing the minimum wage in California at the end of the 1980s. Furthermore, Card (1992b) shows that a minimum wage has the effect of narrowing the spread of remuneration levels, even if its effect on reducing poverty is unclear (Neumark et *al.*, 2005).

While it is understandable to suggest that minimum remuneration levels have a positive effect on average salary levels, how can a positive impact on employment be explained? Conventional (neo-classical) wisdom would have it that salary increases mean a decrease in employment. Several hypotheses have been put forth: some point to employers wielding monopsonistic power, which could lead to setting wage levels too low—a raise in salaries would entice new workers to enter the labor market without calling the employers' economic balance into question (Katz and Krueger (1992) show salary raises do not translate into higher product prices). Further progress in understanding the mechanisms that may connect the creation of minimum wages to average salary levels, degrees of spread of salary levels, and to the availability of employment, it will be necessary to develop finer distinctions, along the lines of what Mara (2001) proposes in a study on minimum wage increases in Indonesia. Over the course of the 1990s, the minimum wage in Indonesia tripled in nominal terms and doubled in real terms. Its effects on average salary levels were relatively modest, its effects on employment were varied: small firms saw their employment volumes noticeably decrease, while those of the larger firms increased. Grasping the root causes of such divergent developments doubtlessly requires—as Sorensen (1994) suggests—complementing analyses based essentially on regressions with more qualitative inquiries, better suited to shedding light on the concrete mechanisms through which establishing a minimum wage makes itself felt in wage negotiations between employers and salaried employees.

Whether looking at the categories of collective understanding actors bring to bear, the rules put in place by collective bargaining, or the legal measures imposed by the State, taking institutions into account is a vital step in understanding the processes of determining remuneration. If we accept that grasping the competitive strategies in play in the labor market between suppliers on the one hand and demanders on the other is integral to the analysis of these processes, then it also becomes necessary to map out those institutions able to weigh on these processes, and to give account of the ways in which they shape the resources and strategies of actors.

3. Exchange and Exchange Closure: from Market to Organization

Remuneration Negotiation, Level and Form

As we discussed above, the Weberian definition of the market requires us to take the competitive interactions between labor suppliers on the one hand and demanders on the other, as well as the relationship of *exchange* that that competition allows to come into being between each party. The relationship of exchange is a unique one in the labor market, and it implies that two generally distinct dimensions of the relation between supplier and demander be taken into account. First, there is the actual moment of hire: this brief, liminal time establishes conditions of their exchange, including monetary conditions. Second, the nature of the relation created between employers and workers begs analysis as well: what is the duration of their relation? What hierarchical relationships are in place between the two actors? The second dimension brings the question of remuneration back to the fore, only this time setting aside the matter of level in favor of shedding light on the heterogeneity of remuneration's *forms*. We shall examine each point in turn.

In the past fifteen years, the study of hiring processes has noticeably recast analysis of labor markets given rise to compelling research (Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal, 1997; Laubach, 2005). Owing to their focus on the heterogeneity of scales used in evaluating potential hires, this scholarship pays fairly little attention to how remuneration is determined. Though M. Granovetter (1981) had made the question of salary matching a fundamental part of his research program, this last has seen precious little follow-up. Granovetter identified three main factors shaping remuneration levels: "a) characteristics of the work and of the employer; b) those of the individual in the job; c) the way in which a) and b) are connected" (p. 12). It is thus the match between supply and demand that should be the focus of attention for sociologists seeking to analyze remuneration. While one may question the exclusivity Granovetter seems to attach to the matching process, it is clear that the analysis of remuneration cannot neglect the key moment in which work conditions—especially monetary ones—are negotiated (or are not negotiated, as we shall see). The comparison of academic job markets in France, Germany and the United States by Musselin (2005) illustrates this point. Musselin reports that these markets share the same trait of being markets of quality, in Karpik's sense of the term (1989): the principle behind the recruitment of a given candidate is decided by committee based on an assessment of the candidate's qualities, while the price is discussed later (by price Musselin has in mind monetary remuneration as well as various material and logistical benefits). Musselin reveals a gradation between France, where salaries are set in established pay scales and cannot be negotiated, Germany, where price variations are caused by regulatory mechanisms and budgetary constraints weighing on institutions, and the United States, where negotiations following the recruiting decision can heavily impact price determination. In other words, negotiation plays a very different role from one market to another: for it to count, regulatory mechanisms and budgetary margins for maneuver must be sufficiently large to afford actors some give. When this is the case, grasp of negotiation practices is a vital step toward understanding how remuneration is determined. In the American market, for example, Musselin shows that when hiring junior faculty, departmental chairpersons conduct the negotiation, and thereby serve as intermediaries between candidates and deans, the true employer representatives. In this triangular game, the strategies employed by the intermediary tend to push salaries higher. By indicating to the candidate a salary close to the maximum offered by the university, and by relating to the dean that the candidate's desired salary is close to the minimum he or she is willing to accept, the chair seeks to secure the highest salary possible for the candidate. At stake for the chair is the chance to secure a salary increase for his or her entire department by getting the new member hired with a generous salary. Again, even though junior faculty recruiting is much more structured than that of senior faculty, one cannot understand salary determination without reconstructing negotiation in detail.

The bond created between those labor suppliers and demanders is not just a negotiated relationship. It is an employment relation between two actors, and remuneration is both a byproduct (symptom) and a dimension of that connection. Sociologists have looked closely at transformations in employment relations (Supiot, 1998; Vatin and Bernard, 2007), and their work has shed decisive light on forms of remuneration. By forms of remuneration, we mean both the *nature* of remuneration (salaries, honoraria, etc.) and their mode of determination: is remuneration fixed or variable (and if so, what criteria cause it to vary?), is it one-off, or recurring (if so, for how long?)? To clarify the nature of different forms of remuneration we shall start from the ideal-type distinction between salaried and freelance labor. Taken broadly, these two forms of work activity differ in that for the latter, the results of labor are what one is being paid for, while for the former one is remunerated for making one's manpower available. Following Garnier (1986), the scale of the distinction between freelance and salaried remuneration can be identified. Garnier reminds us that wage-earners do not limit themselves to promising to complete a task, but place themselves under the employer's authority for the execution of work. From this first distinction follows an important difference in nature between profit and salaries: because they are in charge of labor, employers have its profits and its risks. In exchange for giving up control of the organization of their professional activities, workers acquire the right to a salary—for the duration of the contract—free of the firm's economic vagaries. Freelance workers keep control of the execution of their labor and assume the economic risks of their activity; they are remunerated according to the results of their work and not for the availability of their manpower. For Garnier, the difference in nature between remuneration paid to freelancers and salaried employees stems from the fact that in each case it is not the same thing that is being remunerated: for salaried labor, employers buy a *potentiality*, while in the case of freelancers, employers acquire a *result*.

The heterogeneity of forms of remuneration can thus begin to be mapped out according to their nature, separating remuneration paid in the context of freelance labor from salaried remuneration. Forms of remuneration can also be distinguished as a function of how they are determined, i.e. whether fixed or variable, one-time or recurring. This second dimension captures the heterogeneity of remunerative forms within the large categories we have just identified: remuneration of freelance labor, for example, takes many different forms. An inroad into marking out this terrain can be found in Mottez (1996), who distinguishes between subcontracting on the one hand, to specify "the mode of labor organization in which workers take on the execution of work from employers, are paid for that work, and themselves remunerate other workers they deemed worth hiring to assist them with the task" (p. 16; see chapter 1 as well), and piecework on the other, in which workers sell the product of their labor to employers without hiring other workers whom they will in turn compensate. There is an additional form of freelance remuneration, that of the "honorable" professions, the honorarium (Coster, 1975). For Coster, honorarium denotes a mode of self-employed remuneration in which sums vary by client. He underscores the ambiguities that go into the calculation of honoraria: first, the relationship between the professional and the client is asymmetrical and should be controlled by professional standards. The rhetoric of selflessness in this domain—Coster points out how the services of a lawyer or a doctor "have no price"[p. 378])—suggests that honoraria are in no way comparable to prices adequate to the provision of such services. Second, Coster uses economic analysis of the often very high sums of honoraria to show that "the margin between the commercial price and the service provided by those in certain non-commercial professions is shrinking, and that the sizable difference between the two has more to do with a rationalizing discourse than with actual social practices" (p.378).

The heterogeneity of remuneration paid out in the context of salaries is even greater than that which divides freelance remuneration: at stake in research on payment by salary is the important goal of shedding light on the very profound heterogeneity of situations involved (Castel, 1999; Vatin and Bernard, 2007). In focusing on the contemporary era Menger (2003) points to two paradoxical trends that structure payment by salary, trends that had previously been identified by Supiot (2002). First, payment by salary is widespread: the rate of salaried employment rose throughout the 20th century to reach nearly 90% in the last decade. However, Menger notes that "the particular types of employment on the one hand—short-term contracts, temporary work, apprenticeship contracts, paid internships, contracts sponsored with help from government employment initiatives—and the expansion of part-time work on the other have profoundly altered the image of the salaried workforce" (p. 224). Furthermore, such unusual forms of employment had until recently been taken to be adjustment variables tied to phases of economic cycles, to concern largely low-skilled workers, and to be found in use on the margins of the labor market, particularly in the early and late stages of workers' careers. Menger shows that these notions are misguided, that such atypical forms affect all skill levels, can intervene at any moment in the careers of individuals, and can no longer be analyzed as measures for absorbing shocks of difficult economic climates. Salaried remuneration covers an ever-increasing variety of situations, leading to a breakdown of the legal frameworks able to "particularize management of individual labor situations, levels of insurance coverage, rights of recourse to public or private anti-unemployment campaigns, the expansion of professional activity, and the transitions throughout the cycle of life between an increasing number of work stages (integration, employment, training, parental leave, unemployment, retraining, early retirement, etc.)" (p. 228). As it has spread, salaried employment has fragmented, and its fragmentation has lead to a proliferation of its forms of remuneration.

Remuneration, Labor Markets and Organization

The study of remuneration cannot be limited to the study of *levels* of remuneration; one must also understand the heterogeneity and specificity of its *forms*. By assembling a partial inventory of its forms, one can see that sense can be made of its heterogeneity with the help of the criterion of *stability*, the greater or lesser degree of stability that remuneration maintains between labor suppliers and employers. In other words, forms of remuneration secure more or less exigent forms of closure of labor relations. As Sorensen (1994) shows, that closure has the effect of creating what Marshall (1961) termed rent. Rent refers to the revenue from an asset (fertile land, a major artistic talent, an attractive location, etc.) that is greater than the sums required to make use of the asset. In the case in point, rent is a result of joining a set of workers and a firm, the combination of which produces a benefit greater in value than the sum of values of each of its parts: Marshall calls this composite rent. Sorensen reminds us that composite rents have a property that is of capital importance in how sociology determines its objects of study when approaching remuneration: there is no single market solution for how to divide up this surplus. In other words, sharing out of composite rent among the constituents who create it happens only through negotiation. To analyze remuneration, sociology cannot stay outside the gates of the proverbial kingdom: it must enter inside companies to describe and analyze how rents are apportioned.

To review, if we move beyond the labor market in our analysis of remuneration, part of that analysis must bear on the heterogeneity of forms involved. We then find that they generally hinge on a more or less rigorous closure of labor relations, closure that generates composite rent; furthermore, to understand how that rent is shared out one must look inside firms. In other words, there can be no sociological analysis of remuneration that focuses on the mechanisms at work in the labor markets without also grasping what is unfolding within organizations at the same time. Our reasoning leads us to echo an analytical principle at the core of Baron and Bielby's research (1980): the sociology of labor markets and organizational sociology are at a point of intersection. Thus we find research that seeks to establish a direct link between the internal organization of labor and the remuneration of those engaged by it (cf. the work collected by Baron and Cook (1992). Talbert and Bose (1977) provide evidence of an impact on remuneration levels that is inherent to organizational contexts, and independent of both individual characteristics and the functioning of the labor market. In addition, Kalleberg and Van Buren (1996) indicate that a relationship can be found between the size of an organization and remuneration levels by showing that remuneration is greater in large companies (and particularly in those which have created internal markets), while Ferrall (1995) focuses on a more specific population in order to show that understanding the remuneration of American engineers absolutely requires understanding their position in the hierarchy of their organizations.

Their work seeks to elucidate the causal chains that allow us to go beyond the programmatic discourse of Baron and Bielby or Sorensen (Osterman, 2006; Pencavel et *al.*, 2006), if not to develop a fuller, more systematic representation altogether. Going in this direction, Cappelli and Cascio (1991) show that the jobs that pay the largest bonuses are the ones that sit atop promotion ladders, require more specific skills, and—to a lesser extent—provide a degree of influence within the organization. In order to define these causal links more precisely, one possible research strategy may be to examine how the impact of certain organizational characteristics on remuneration varies in relation to characteristics of individuals and of sectors of activity. For example, Villemez and Bridges (1988) provide evidence of a link between the size of an organization and the level of remuneration; yet, by showing that their connection varies according to group (populations are separated by gender, type of occupation and industry), they make clear that it is largely an indirect relation that is mediated by internal markets, requisite conditions regarding linguistic mastery, and by unionization. As a result, the effects of organizational size can also vary based on whether a firm has one or multiple sites. More specifically, firm size bears most heavily on remuneration for white-collar workers, while for blue-collar workers the size of the site is more significant. In more analytical terms, Sorensen (1994) offers an impressive inventory of incentive strategies used by firms, and parses out those strategies that connect the level of remuneration to worker effort from those that tie remuneration to results. Regardless of the perspective or disciplinary approach employed in each case, these researchers show that in economies where the great majority of social actors find their primary source of income in labor, and where their incomes most often take the form of a salary that links workers more or less enduringly to an organization, one cannot hope to give proper account of remuneration without also inquiring into the dynamics of labor markets and of organizations.

Conclusion

To conclude, we return to our initial questions. The sharing-out of disciplinary work seems very different from what we described at the start: sociology has in fact tackled the question of remuneration amply, and it has done so by borrowing much from economics. The contributions of sociology to the question are not exclusively—nor perhaps much at all—economic sociology: studies of inequality, for instance, have contributed keen insights into the question. When focused on economic mechanisms, sociologists borrow heavily from economics in both its orthodox versions (human capital) and heterodox (the theory of segmentation). What role does the notion of labor market play in sociological inquiry into the question of remuneration? The only possible answer to this question is ambivalent: on one hand, few studies make real use of the notion as an operative and heuristic tool; instead, the literature utilizes the notions of segments, networks, labor processes, employment systems, or employment relations. On the other hand, we sought to show that much research could expand on the Weberian definition of market. Remuneration is at the heart of the *competitive processes* at work between suppliers and demanders, processes described *de facto* in many empirical studies. Remuneration can be the *result* of these processes, when its level depends on the resources committed by actors in competitive struggle with one another, and it can be the *instrument* of these processes, when actors attempt to outmatch their rivals by increasing remuneration levels. The competitive processes are framed by the actors' categories of understanding, by the total or partial closure of markets, and by rules enforced by employment relations or public powers. The study of remuneration also gains much from consideration of the *exchange* between suppliers and demanders: on the one hand, analysis of hiring processes sheds light on how the level of remuneration is defined, while on the other analysis of the link between employers and workers (salaried or freelance) is integral to understanding the *forms* remuneration takes.

From our partial exploration of the literature, two final questions remain, and they are of a piece: what role should be reserved for labor markets in the analysis of remuneration? What role should the study of remuneration have in the analysis of labor markets? The literature shows that while labor markets are of major importance, that attention should not be exclusive: first, it is not clear that all of the effects of the sociological factors likely to shape remuneration distribution (such as gender, age, place of residence, education-level, etc.) are mediated entirely and exclusively by labor markets. Second, as we have shown, analysis of labor markets has shed light on more or less rigorous *closure* phenomena that require us to follow up that inquiry with analysis of organizational practices. To return at last to the question of whether remuneration is a pertinent object of study for labor market sociologists, the answer is also two-fold: it surely is, although it does not seem to merit being a privileged or exclusive one. Remuneration is just one dimension of the competition and exchange at work in labor markets and, while there is no reason to keeping it veiled in secrecy, there is just as little reason for it to become the predominant subject of all relevant inquiry. In other words, while the question of remuneration is clearly too important to be left to economists alone, it is also too specific to become the sole preoccupation of sociologists.

Ashenfelter, O. and Johnson, G. E., 1969, "Bargaining theory, trade unions and industrial strike activity", *American economic review*, 59 (1), p. 35-49.
Averitt, R. T., 1968, *The dual economy: the dynamics of American industry*, New York, Horton.
Baron, J. N. and Bielby, W. T., 1980, "Bringing the firm back in: stratification, segmentation, and the organization of work", *American sociological review*, 45 (5), p. 737-765.
Baron, J. N. and Bielby, W. T., 1984, "The organization of work in a segmented economy", *American sociological review*, 49 (4), p. 454-473.
Baron, J. N. and Cook, K. S., 1991, "Process and outcome: perspectives on the distribution of rewards in organizations", *Administrative science quarterly*, 37 (2), p. 191-197.
Barron, J. M., Black, D. A. and Loewenstein, M. A., 1993, "Gender differences in training, capital, and wages", *The journal of human resources*, 28 (2), p. 343-364.
Baudelot, C. and Gollac, M., 2003, *Travailler pour être heureux ? Le bonheur et le travail en France*, Paris, Fayard.
Becker, G. S., 1983, *Human capital : a theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference to education*, New Brunswick, N.J., Midway Reprint, 268 p.
Beckert, J., 2009, "The social order of markets", *Theory and society*, 38 (3), p. 245-269.
Bernhardt, A., Morris, M. and Handcock, M., 1995, "Women's gains or men's losses? A closer look at the shrinking gender gap in earnings", *American journal of sociology*, 101 (2), p. 302-328.
Bielby, W. T. and Bielby, D. D., 1999, "Organizational mediation of project-based labor markets: talent agencies and the careers of screenwriters", *American sociological review*, 64 (1), p. 64-85.
Biernacki, R., 1995, *The fabrication of labor. Germany and Britain, 1640-1914*, Berkeley, University of California press, 569 p.
Bihagen, E., 2005, "Labour market rewards and the neo-classical soup: an analysis of the relation between social class and economic inequalities in Sweden in the last quarter of the 20th Century", *Acta sociologica*, 48 (1), p. 63-84.
Black, D. A., McKinnish, T. G. and Sanders, S. G., 2005, "Tight labor markets and the demand for education: evidence from the coal boom and bust", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 59 (1), p. 3-16.
Blau, P. M. and Duncan, O. D., 1967, *The American occupational structure*, New York, Wiley.
Blau, F. D. and Kahn, L. M., 2006, "The U.S. Gender pay gap in the 1990s: slowing convergence", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 60 (1), p. 45-66.
Brainerd, E., 2000, "Women in transition: changes in gender wage differentials in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 54 (1), p. 138-162.
Bridges, W. and Villemez, W., 1986, "Informal hiring and income in the labor market", *American sociological review*, 51 (4), p. 574-582.
Cappelli, P. and Cascio, W. F., 1991, "Why some jobs command wage premiums: a test of career tournament and internal labor market hypotheses", *The academy of management journal*, 34 (4), p. 848-868.
Card, D., 1992a, "The effects of unions on the distribution of wages : redistributing or relabelling?" *NBER*, 4195 p.
Card, D., 1992b, "Do minimum wages reduce employment? A case sudy of California, 1987-1989", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 46 (1), p. 38-54
Card, D. and Krueger, A. B., 1995, *Myth and measurement : the new economics of the minimum wage*, Princeton, Princeton university press.
Carpenter, C. S., 2005, "Self-reported sexual orientation and earnings: evidence from California", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 58 (2), p. 258-273.
Castel, R., 1999, *Les métamorphoses de la question sociale. Une chronique du salariat*, Paris, Gallimard.
Cochoy, F. and Dubuisson-Quellier, S., 2000, "Introduction. Les professionnels du marché : vers une sociologie du travail marchand", *Sociologie du travail*, 42 (3), p. 359-369.

Cotter, D. A., DeFiore, J., Hermsen, J. M., Kowalewski, B. M. and Vanneman, R., 1997, "All women benefit: the macro-level effect of accupational integration on gender-earnings quality", *American sociological review*, 62 (5), p. 714-734.

Descombes, V., 1996, *Les institutions du sens*, Paris, Editions de minuit, 350 p.

DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W., 1983, "The iron cage revisited : institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields", *American sociological review*, 48, p. 147-160.

Doeringer, P. B. and Piore, M. J., 1971, *Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis*, Lexington, Head Lexington Books, 215 p.

Domanski, H., 1990, "Dynamics of labor markets segmentation in Poland, 1982-1987", *Social forces*, 69 (2), p. 423-438.

Dougherty, C., 2005, "Why are returns to schooling higher for women than for men?" *The journal of human resources*, 40 (4), p. 969-988.

Eymard-Duvernay, F. and Marchal, E., 1997, *Façons de recruter : le jugement des compétences sur le marché du travail*, Paris, Métailié, 239 p.

Feldman, R. and Scheffler, R., 1982, "The union impact on hospital wages and fringe benefits", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 35 (2), p. 196-206.

Ferrall, C., 1995, "Levels of responsability in jobs and the distribution of earnings among U.S. engineers, 1961-1986", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 49 (1), p. 150-169.

François, P., 2005, *Le monde de la musique ancienne. Sociologie économique d'une innovation esthétique*, Paris, Economica, 232 p.

François, P., 2008, *Sociologie des marchés*, Paris, Armand Colin, 320 p.

François, P. and Chartrain, V., 2009, "Les critiques d'art contemporain : petit monde éditorial et économie de la gratuité", *Histoire et mesure*, 24 (1).

Freeman, R. B., 1980, "Unionism and the dispersion of wages", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 34 (1), p. 3-23.

Freeman, R. and Medoff, J., 1984, *What do unions do ?*, New York, Basic books.

Friedberg, E., 1997, *Le pouvoir et la règle*, Paris, Seuil, 423 p.

Garcia, M.-F., 1986, "La construction sociale d'un marché parfait : le marché au cadran de Fontaines-en-Sologne", *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, (65), p. 2-13.

Garnier, O., 1986, "La théorie néo-classique face au contrat de travail : de la "main invisible" à la "poignée de main invisible"" *in* Salais, R. and Thévenot, L. (dir.), *Le travail. Marchés, règles, conventions*, Paris, Insee-Economica, p. 313-331.

Gerber, T. P., 2006, "Getting paid: wage arrears and stratification in Russia", *American journal of sociology*, 111 (6), p. 1816-1870.

Godechot, O., 2007, *Working rich. Salaires, bonus et appropriation du profit dans l'industrie financière*, Paris, La découverte, 307 p.

Granovetter, M. S., 1981, "Toward a sociological theory of income differences" *in* Berg, I. (dir.), *Sociological perspectives on labor markets*, New York, Academic press, p. 11-48.

Granovetter, M. S., 1995, *Getting a job. A study of contacts and careers. Second edition*, Chicago, University of Chicago press, 251 p.

Granovetter, M. S. and Tilly, C., 1988, "Inequality and labor processes" *in* Smelser, N. J. (dir.), *Handbook of sociology*, Newbury Park, Sage, p. 175-222.

Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Suddaby, R. and Sahlin-Anderson, K. (dir.), 2008, *The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism*, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 840 p.

Gupta, N., Oaxaca, R. L. and Smith, N., 2006, "Swimming upstream, floating downstream: comparing women's relative wage progress in the United States and Denmark", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 59 (2), p. 243-266.

Hannan, M. T., Schomann, K. and Blossfeld, H.-P., 1990, "Sex and sector differences in the dynamics of wage growth in the Federal Republic of Germany", *American sociological review*, 55 (5), p. 694-713.

Hirsch, B. T. and Connolly, R. A., 1987, "Do unions capture monopoly profit ?" *Industrial and labor relations review*, 41 (1), p. 118-136
Hirsch, P., 1972, "Processing fads and fashions : an organizational set analysis of cultural industry systems", *American journal of sociology*, 77 (4), p. 639-659.
Jencks, C., Perman, L. and Rainwater, L., 1988, "What is a good job ? A new measure of labor-market success", *American journal of sociology*, 93 (6), p. 1322-1357.
Johannsson, M., Katz, K. and Nyman, H., 2005, "Wage differentials and gender discrimination: changes in Sweden 1981-1998", *Acta sociologica*, 48 (4), p. 341-364.
Kalleberg, A. L., 1977, "Work values and job rewards: a theory of job satisfaction", *American sociological review*, 42 (1), p. 124-143.
Kalleberg, A. L., 1989, "Linking macro and micro levels : bringing workers back into the sociology of work", *Social forces*, 67 (3), p. 582-592.
Kalleberg, A. L. and Sorensen, A., 1979, "The sociology of labor markets", *Annual review of sociology*, 5, p. 371-379.
Kalleberg, A. L. and Van Buren, M. E., 1996, "Is bigger better? Explaining the relationship between organization size and job rewards", *American sociological review*, 61 (1), p. 47-66.
Kalleberg, A. L., Wallace, M. and Althauser, R. P., 1981, "Economic segmentation, worker power, and income inequality", *American journal of sociology*, 87 (3), p. 651-683.
Karpik, L., 1989, "L'économie de la qualité", *Revue française de sociologie*, 30 (2), p. 187-210.
Karpik, L., 1999, *French Lawyers. A study in collective action, 1274-1994*, Oxford, Oxford university press, 330 p.
Katz, L. F. and Krueger, A. B., 1992, "The effect of the minimum wage on the fast food industry", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 46 (1), p. 6-21.
Kaufman, R. L., 1983, "A structural decomposition of Black-White earnings differentials", *American journal of sociology*, 89 (3), p. 585-611.
Langton, N. and Pfeffer, J., 1994, "Paying the professor: sources of salary variation in academic labor markets", *American sociological review*, 59 (2), p. 236-256.
Laubach, M., 2005, "Consent, informal organization and job rewards", *Social forces*, 83 (4), p. 1535-1565.
Lieberson, S., 1980, *A piece of the tie. Blacks and white immigrants since 1880*, Berkeley, University of California press.
Mandel, H. and Semyonov, M., 2005, "Family policies, wage structures and gender gaps: sources of earnings inequality in 20 countries", *American sociological review*, 70 (6), p. 949-967.
Marini, M. M., 1989, "Sex differences in earnings in the United States", *Annual review of sociology*, 15, p. 343-380.
Marsden, D., 1999, *A theory of employment system: micro foundations of societal diversity*, Oxford, Oxford university press, 298 p.
Marsden, P. V. and Hulbert, J., 1988, "Social resources and mobility outcomes : a replication and extension", *Social forces*, 66 (4), p. 1038-1059.
Marshall, A., 1961, *Principles of economics*, London, Macmillan and Co.
McManus, P. A., 2000, "Market, state, and the quality of new self-employment jobs among men in the U.S. and Western Germany", *Social forces*, 78 (3), p. 865-905.
Menger, P.-M., 2003, "Deux physiques sociales du travail. L'invention d'un espace continu des cotations du travailleur et des états individuels d'activité" *in* Menger, P.-M. (dir.), *Les professions et leurs sociologies. Modèles théoriques, catégorisations, évolutions*, Paris, Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, p. 217-245.
Meyer, J. W. and Rowan, B., 1977, "Institutionalized organizations : formal structure as myth and ceremony", *American journal of sociology*, 83 (2), p. 340-363.
Mishel, L., 1986, "The structural determinants of union bargaining power", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 40 (1), p. 90-104.

Moll, P. G., 1993, "Black South African Unions: relative wage effects in international perspective", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 46 (2), p. 245-261.
Morris, M. and Western, B., 1999, "Inequality in earnings at the close of the twentieth century", *Annual review of sociology*, 25, p. 623-657
Mottez, B., 1966, *Système de salaire et politiques patronales. Essai sur l'évolution des pratiques et des idéologies patronales*, Paris, Editions du CNRS, 266 p.
Musselin, C., 2005, *Le marché des universitaires. France, Allemagne, Etats-Unis*, Paris, Presses de sciences po.
Neuman, S. and Ziderman, A., 1986, "Testing the dual labor market hypothesis evidence from the israel labor mobility survey", *The journal of human resources*, 21 (2), p. 230-237.
Neumark, D., Schweitzer, M. and Wascher, W., 2005, "The effects of minimum wages on the distribution of family incomes: a non parametric analysis", *The journal of human resources*, 40 (4), p. 867-894.
Noonan, M. C., Corcoran, M. E. and Courant, P. N., 2005, "Pay differences among the highly trained: cohort differences in the sex gap in lawyers' earnings", *Social forces*, 84 (2), p. 853-872.
Osterman, P., 2006, "The wage effects of high performance work organization in manufacturing", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 59 (2), p. 187-204.
Paradeise, C., 1984, "La marine marchande française, un marché du travail fermé ?" *Revue française de sociologie*, 25 (2), p. 352-375.
Parsons, T., 1965, "Profession", *International encyclopedia of social sciences. Vol. XII*, p. 536-547
Pencavel, J., Pistaferri, L. and Schivardi, F., 2006, "Employment and capital in capitalist and work-owned firms", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 60 (1), p. 23-44.
Piketty, T., 2004, *L'économie des inégalités*, Paris, La découverte.
Piore, M. J., 1973, "Fragments of a sociological theory of wages", *American economic review*, 63 (2), p. 377-384.
Piore, M. J., 1975, "Notes for a theory of labor market stratification" *in* Edwards, R., Reich, M. and Gordon, D. (dir.), *Labor market segmentation*, Lexington, D.C. Heath, p. 125-150.
Piore, M. J., 1978, "Dualism in the labor market", *Revue économique*, 19 (1), p. 26-48.
Rose, D. C., 1991, "Are strikes less effective in conglomerate firms ?" *Industrial and labor relations review*, 45 (1), p. 131-144.
Rosen, S., 1981, "The economics of superstar", *American economic review*, 71 (5), p. 845-858.
Sarfati-Larson, M., 1977, *The rise of professionnalism*, Berkeley, University of California press, 309 p.
Simmel, G., 1999, "Le conflit" *in* Simmel, G., *Sociologie. Etudes sur les formes de la socialisation*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, p. 265-347
Smith, M. R., 1990, "What is new in "new structuralist" analyses of earnings ?" *American sociological review*, 55 (6), p. 827-841.
Sorensen, A. B., 1994, "Firms, wages, and incentives" *in* Smelser, N. J. and Swedberg, R. (dir.), *Handbook of economic sociology*, Princeton/New Yor, Princeton university press/Russell Sage Foundations, p. 504-528.
Stark, D., 2009, *The sense of dissonance. Accounts of worth in economic life*, Princeton, Princeton university press, 250 p.
Supiot, A., 1998, (dir.), *Le travail en perspectives*, Paris, L.G.D.J.
Supiot, A., 2002, *Critique du droit du travail*, Paris, PUF.
Swedberg, R., 1998, *Max Weber and the idea of economic sociology*, Princeton, Princeton university press, 315 p.
Talbert, J. and Bose, C. E., 1977, "Wage-attainment processes: the retail clerk case", *American journal of sociology*, 83 (2), p. 403-424.
Tienda, M. and Lii, D.-T., 1987, "Minority concentration and earnings inequaliy: Blacks, hispanics and asians compared", *American journal of sociology*, 93 (1), p. 141-165.

Tomaskovic-Devey, D., Thomas, M. and Johnson, K., 2005, "Race and the accumulation of human capital across the career: a theoretical model and fixed-effects application", *American journal of sociology*, 111 (1), p. 58-89.

Vatin, F. and Bernard, S., 2007, *Le salariat : théorie, histoire et formes*, Paris, La dispute, 346 p.

Vatin, F., 2009, (dir.), *Evaluer et valoriser. Une sociologie économique de la mesure*, Toulouse, Presses universitaires du Mirail.

Villemez, W. J. and Bridges, W. P., 1988, "When bigger is better: differences in the individual-level effect of firm and establishment size", *American sociological review*, 53 (2), p. 237-255.

Waldinger, R. and Robertson, G., 1994, "Immigrants' progress: ethnic and gender differences among U.S. immigrants in the 1980s", *Sociological perspectives*, 37 (3), p. 431-444.

Wallerstein, M., Golden, M. and Lange, P., 1997, "Unions, employers'associations, and wage-setting institutions in Northern and Central Europe, 1950-1992", *Industrial and labor relations review*, 50 (3), p. 379-401.

Weber, M., 1978, *Economy and society. An outline of interpretive sociology*, Berkeley, University of California press, 1469 p.

Weber, M., 1992, "Essai sur quelques catégories de la sociologie compréhensive" *in* Weber, M., *Essais sur la théorie de la science*, Paris, Plon, p. 301-364.

Western, B. and Pettit, B., 2005, "Black-white wage inequality, employment rates, and incarceration", *American journal of sociology*, 111 (2), p. 553-578.

Wilensky, H., 1964, "The professionalization of everyone", *American journal of sociology*, (2), p. 137-158.

Zhou, M. and Logan, J. R., 1989, "Returns on human capital in ethnic enclaves: New York City's Chinatown", *American sociological review*, 54 (5), p. 809-820.